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THE RIO REVISION OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION - PART I
By

GEORGE W. ORR
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Judge, Greenville, S. C.; President of Reynolds Airways and Reynolds Aviation of North Carolina; President and General Manager
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HE rapid development of air commerce and the important place
it has assumed in our modern civilization should challege the
interest of all lawyers. Few otherwise well informed men realize the
extent of this development, either in magnitude or in safety. The
world's scheduled airlines, for instance, flew almost 24 billion passenger
miles in 1952 - enough to transport 7 million people, nearly the population of New York or greater London, from New York to Western
Europe, or to the Valley of the Amazon.' One-third of this immense
traffic was international.
United States airlines exceeded the first-class (Pullman) service
on railways by 20% in 1952 and carried about a third of the total
common carrier passenger traffic (all classes of railway, motorbus and
airline accommodation combined) moving over a distance of 120
miles. Over 27 million passengers were carried more than 16 billion
passenger miles with passenger fatalities reduced to 0.9 per one hundred
million passenger miles -less than one passenger fatality for each
100 million passenger miles flown! 2 1953 will bring the passenger
total to about 31 million, the passenger mileage to 19 billion and reduce
the death rate to 0.6 per 100 million passenger miles.' United States
overseas air routes (excluding air traffic with Canada, Mexico, Alaska
or Puerto Rico) carried more passengers than travelled by ship in 1952.
An international treaty which regulates certain liabilities of our international air carriers, such as the Warsaw Convention, is therefore of
general interest and importance.
A movement to codify international air law began with a conference in Paris in 1925 which set up a continuing commission, called
Comit6 International Techinque d'Experts Juridioues Aeriens
(CITEJIA) 4 to prepare draft conventions for consideration by future
international conferences. They created about a dozen, only one of

I ICAO

Bulletin, June-July, 1953, p. 6.
2 C.A.B. Comparison of Accidents in Scheduled Operations 1951.1952.
8 Estimate C.A.B. Bureau of Accident Investigation, Jan. 14, 1954.
4 C.C.H. Aviation Law Reports, §27,040.
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which, the Warsaw Convention, 5 received general adherence by most
important nations of the world. That Convention was signed in Warsaw in 1929. The United States adhered in 1934. Briefly, the Warsaw
Convention is a "Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air" (its proper name) ;
its application is determined by the contract of transportation and not
by the place of accident -when between two nations adhering to the
treaty, or from one adhering nation to a destination in that same
nation, if there has been an agreed stopping place in another nation
whether an adherent or not. It imposes liability on the carrier for
injury to passengers, baggage and/or goods unless the carrier can
affirmatively prove that it and its agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage (or in the case of baggage and goods that the
damage was caused by an error in piloting or navigation) and limits
recovery: for death or injury of passengers to the present U.S. currency
value of $8,291.87; baggage and goods to $16.58 per kilogram (2.2046
lbs.) ; and $331.67 for objects of which the passenger takes charge himself, unless the passenger affirmatively proves that the damage was
caused by wilful misconduct, in which case there would be no limit.
The limitation for bringing an action is two years.
The work of CITEJA was assumed by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (commonly referred to as ICAO) which grew
out of the Chicago conference in 1944. The drafting of international
conventions comes under the jurisdiction of the ICAO Legal Committee. This Committee, among other things, has been studying the
revision of the Warsaw Convention for several years, more recently
in Madrid in, 1952, Paris and Rio in 1953. At the latter Session, it
completed a draft and submitted it to the ICAO Council for probable
reference to an international diplomatic conference.
The revised text of the Warsaw Convention adopted in 1953 by
the Legal Committee at its meeting in Rio de Janeiro is a real improvement over the existing text, and with a few minor but tremendously important corrections, would create a more desirable treaty than
the one presently in effect. Based upon my actual experience with
aviation claims

-

foreign and domestic

-

and litigation growing out

of such claims, which I believe to be more than any other man in this
hemisphere, it is my considered opinion that the Warsaw Convention
has been of real value to both the claimants seeking damages growing
out of flights subject to the treaty and to the carriers operating those
flights.
Although a lawyer for Underwriters insuring aviation risks, I do
not consider myself biased or serving self-interest, since it is the job
of insurance companies to insure the risk presented. Whether loss
pavments are large or small does not particularly affect the insurer's
welfare - except that the greater the loss, the larger the premium must
. See .5 JRL. OF ATR LAW & CoM. 486.
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be to absorb that loss as well as other expenses and profit, and the
amount of profit permitted the highly competitive and closely regulated insurers is largely determined by the premium volume. The
final burden of liability falls upon the carrier, whether insured or uninsured, and it is that industry that is primarily affected. My interest
in attempting to assist in drafting sound liability legislation, including
treaties, is to contribute anything I can that will be to the interest of
both the airline and the public, not to give special privilege either to
one party or the other. Anything that is good for the carrier and just
for the public will ultimately be to the benefit of aviation insureres
and to the nation.
The ICAO Legal Committee is to be commended for choosing to
use the existing Convention as the basis for amendment rather than
the Paris text. There were improvements in the Paris text that are not
included in the protocol text, but there were also many ill-advised
provisions that in my opinion outweighed the improvements. I personally am still fearful that any action that brings up before the U. S.
Senate the present adherence to the Warsaw Convention" might result
in denunciation of the Convention as now in effect, rather than adoption of the legislation submitted, but of the two approaches, I believe
that a short simple protocol, along the line of the proposed text
amending the present Convention, would have a better chance of
ratification by the U. S. Senate than a completely reformed substitute
text.
In this discussion, I will comment upon the protocol text, and
then offer what I consider a very important provision that should be
advanced by the United States in connection with any action on the
Warsaw Convention, or perhaps independently. The objective of the
provision would be to cure a deficiency that now exists and which I
have not heard discussed in this connection - the creation of a right
of action for accidents in foreign jurisdiction. My views and comments,
as well as suggested improvements, follow in the order of the Rio
7
draft protocol.
Agreed'Stopping Place Should Be Defined
Article I, 2 of the Rio Draft:
"For the purposes of the Convention, the expression 'international
carriage' means any carriage in which, according to the agreement
between the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties or within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the
territory of another State, even if that State is not a High Contracting Party. Carriage between two points within the territory
of a single High Contracting Party without an agreed stopping
6 Ibid.
720 JRL. OF AIR LAW &

1/10/53 (October 1, 1953).

COM. 326 (Summer, 1953). DOC. 7425 LC/135

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

place within the territory of another State is not international
carriage for the purpose of the Convention."
The phrase "agreed stopping place" is retained in the definition
of "international carriage" and the phrase is not defined. This is one
of the potential danger spots as a cause of confusion and expensive
litigation. Different courts can interpret the phrase differently and
this lack of uniformity will cause injustice as between claimants.
Agreement means a meeting of the minds of two contracting parties.
It is difficult to prove, if literal proof is required by any court, that
there was actually a meeting of the minds on a point entirely incidental and otherwise unessential to the journey being arranged. A passenger from Miami to San Juan may not be interested in whether or not
his plane stops in Cuba or Haiti, and the matter may not even be discussed. It becomes of interest only in interpreting Article 1, 2. Then
it becomes crucial. It seems the height of folly to set up such a trap
for expense and delay. An honest effort to make the "international
carriage" definition as clear as possible is assumed.
It would certainly clarify the basic definition of scope to define
just what "agreed stopping place" means. My suggestion is that it be
defined, perhaps as a (b) addition to the revised Article 1, Paragraph
2, to the following effect:
(b) The agreed stopping place or places, if any, shall be the
intermediate landing places indicated by the contract of carriage
or the schedule or time table of the carrier or successive carriers
involved in the carriage.
Such decisions as We have in the United States indicate that it is
sufficient to incorporate by reference the stopping places in the sched-

ule. The object of this protocol, however, is to simplify the carriage
documents, as well as to avoid uncertainties and ambiguities necessitating litigation. A definition along the line suggested should accomplish

the objective without detracting from the passengers' interest.
Scope of Treaty Should Be Broadened
It is unfortunate that the ICAO Committee, against considerable
opposition, decided to recommend no change in Article I which defines the scope of the Convention. The reasons given are: (1) that
certain additional states intend to accede to the Convention, which
makes the definition of the scope of the Convention of diminishing
practical importance; and (2) that the provisions would not be binding on non-member states. This reasoning illustrates the theoretical
and impractical thinking of some learned lawyers.
As to reason (1) the mere fact that certain national representatives
in this changing world have indicated a future intention to accede to
the Convention does not justify the decision that the matter is of
diminishing practical importance as the Committee asserted.
The statement in reason (2), that the provisions of the Convention
would not be enforceable in non-member nations, is quite true. How-

RIO REVISION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION

ever, this does not justify the conclusion that such a provision is of
little value. If, as proposed in the Paris text, "international carriage"
is defined as all carriage between nations or with a stopping place in
another nation, it would undoubtedly be of tremendous practical
importance to make the provisions of the Convention applicable to
claims growing out of such international carriage which are litigated
in any member nation.
In a flight, for instance, from U. S. to Afghanistan (assuming the
United States to be an adherent and Afghanistan a non-member), it is
true that the Convention would not be enforceable in Afghanistan
but it would nevertheless be enforceable in the United States. Therefore, a person prosecuting a claim in the United States would be controlled by the provisions of the Convention even though he could
avoid the Convention by suing in Afghanistan. From my experience
the latter course would seldom be chosen and, therefore, since most
major nations are adherents and most passengers come from such
nations, most of the claims would be brought in member nations and
thus the influence and scope of the Convention would be tremendously
broadened. If the Convention is good for the public of adhering
nations when the journey is between members, it should be equally
good if between a member and a non-member. I suggest that a definition similar to that recommended in the Paris text be used, such as:
"2. For the purpose of this Convention the expression 'international carriage' means any carriage by aircraft of passengers,
cargo or baggage for remuneration when, according to an agreement to carry, the places of departure and of destination are
situated either in the territories of different States of which one
at least is a Contracting State, or in the territory of the same Contracting State when an intermediate landing has been agreed in
the territory of another State, even if the latter is a non-Contracting State."
Should Apply to Carriersin Military Service
Article II, 2, of the Rio draft is revised so that the Convention shall
not apply to:
"(a) Carriage of persons, cargo and baggage for military authorities by aircraft, the whole capacity of which has been reserved by
such authorities."
There is no valid reason why the passenger or the carrier should
not be given the advantage of the Convention just because the whole
capacity of the aircraft has been reserved by military authorities. Perhaps the most important consideration for encouragement of aviation
by governments is the tremendous value of an aeronautical industry
ready to serve the public interest in time of emergency. The extensive
use of privately owned aircraft and government aircraft operated by
the flying crews of private air carriers in the Korean incident illustrates
this increasing role of private aviation. While some governments may
wish to avoid entirely any responsibility in such circumstances, and
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may do so under governmental immunity when such exists, the private
carrier has no such protection. It is realized that the requirements of
the existing Convention are not always complied with in connection
with this governmental use but with more realistic and practical requirements for compliance, this may be a matter of diminishing
importance. I suggest that the subject sub-section (a) be deleted or
preferably redrawn to relieve the government of the liability imposed
by the Convention, if desirable, but retaining the application of the
Convention to the carrier and his agents.
Notice of Limitation Must Be Alternative
Article III of the Rio draft carries a provision in both 1 and 2, as
well as similar requirements in later Articles affecting baggage and
cargo, that must be corrected.
"1. For the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be delivered
containing particulars which show that the carrage is international
in the sense of Article 1, and a statement that the carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability established by the Convention."
"2. The passenger ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the conclusion and conditions of the contract of carriage. The
absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket does not affect
the existence or the contract of carriage which shall, none the
less, be subject to the rules of the Convention. Nevertheless, if the
carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having
been delivered or if the ticket does not include the statement that
the carriageis subject to the rules relating to liability established
by the Convention, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of any
provisions which limit his liability in respect of the passenger."
These provisions, as well as similar ones with respect to baggage
and cargo, carry the requirement that I think may be extremely important and certainly should be corrected to avoid needless litigation,
delay and expense. That requirement is the provision that the carriage
document must contain a definite and unequivocal statement that the
carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability established by the
Convention. I am thoroughly in agreement with a requirement that
the passenger must have notice that the carriage, when Warsaw, is
subject to the rules relating to liability. That is not the point. The
practical situation is that all international journeys or shipments are
not subject to the Convention. Tickets or other contracts for carriage
are made out by clerks of airlines, travel and other agencies. They are
required to make, not an alternative statement, but the positive statement that the carriage he is selling is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by the Convention. This is a legal decision that
ticket sellers could not be expected to make. They are not required
to give legal advice on the passengers' other legal problems of travel.
In some instances, experienced lawyers have disagreed as to Convention
applicability to the point that litigation was necessary to determine
the issue. It is certainly not fair to expect a clerk to make such a de-
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cision or to penalize the carrier with the loss of limitation if he makes
a mistake.
While Article 3, Paragraph 1, might be interpreted to require only
that the ticket contain particulars which show that the carriage is international and that the required statement about liability depends upon
applicability, Paragraph 2 states quite definitely that "if the carrier
accepts the passenger without a ticket having been delivered or if the
ticket does not include the statement that the carriage is subject to the
rules relating to liability

. .

." the carrier shall not be entitled to avail

himself of the limit. The carrier's only defense would be to place a
notice in the ticket that, if the journey is international in the sense of
Article 1, it is subject to the rules relating to liability, etc. Whether
or not this would be a sufficient compliance would depend upon judicial ruling and there is bound to be a lack of uniformity in the interpretations by courts of various nations. The ambiguity will encourage
litigation in all nations and, hence, the exorbitant costs and long
delays incident to litigation.
The remedy is very simple. Instead of requiring a positive statement that the Convention rules relating to liability apply, it should
be sufficient to state that if the Convention applies to the journey, then
the rules relating to liability would also apply. The last phrase following the words in Article 3, Paragraph 1, must be changed to read:
"And a statement that if the carriage is international in the sense of
Article 1, it is subject to the rules relating to liability established by
the Convention."
The last sentence of Article 3, Paragraph 2, must be changed to read
as follows:
"Nevertheless. if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered, or if the carriage is international
in the sense of Article 1 and the ticket does not include the statement that the carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by the Convention, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of any provisions which limit his liability in respect of the
passenger."
Similar appropriate changes must be made in the baggage and air
waybill requirements. The notice could then be placed on all tickets,
whether Warsaw or not.
Defense Should Be Made More Realistic
The deletion of Paragraph 2 in Article 20, which exempts liability
caused by error of piloting or navigation, seems appropriate as it is
sort of an imposition of admiralty rules upon an otherwise tort instrument. Paragraphs 1 and 2 really clash in legal theory.
I was disappointed, however, that Article 20 was not amended to
more realistically implement the justice involved in the theory of fault
as the basis of liability. Paragraph 1 provides:
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"The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it
is impossible for him or them to take such measures."
This is the only provision that saves the Warsaw Convention from
imposing absolute liability without fault - a doctrine completely repugnant to the American concept of law and justice in connection
with passenger-carrier liability. The carrier is not the insurer of his
passenger. 8 While extremely valuable in controlling the excessive
demands incident to absolute liability, even in its present form, it has
proven itself to be most impractical and unrealistic except for such
purposes. In all Warsaw litigation that I recall, there has been only
one successful defense under this section and that claim was settled
before appeal and at the full Warsaw limit. This is because it is difficult to conceive of an accident happpening when all necessary measures
to avoid the damage were taken. If everything necessary to avoid the
damage had been done, how could there be damage?
As now worded, this provision appears to be an almost meaningless
gesture by adherents of imposed liability to our established doctrine
that fault must be the basis for liability. It could be easily corrected
to more honestly reflect the theory of fault as the basis of liability in
connection with the liability automatically imposed by Article 1.7, and
with entire justice to the passenger. I suggest that the paragraph be
changed to read:
"The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have exercised the highest practicable degree of care to avoid the
damage."
This would assure to the passenger the ultimate in care, but also would
not impose liability upon the carrier to do the impossible in either
taking measures he could not take or assuming liability for events he
could not control.
Limit for PassengerLiability Increased 60%
Article 22, Paragraph 1. The limit for fatal or non-fatal injury is
increased from 125,000 gold francs ($8,291.87) to 200,000 frs. ($13,267)
or 60%.
Because of social thinking, but definitely not because of economic
inflation, there undoubtedly has been considerable pressure in the
United States, in particular, and a few other nations, for a considerable
increase in the Warsaw limit, although the official ICAO Report and
the final Rio action indicates that the governments of many nations
considered the existing maximum limits to be satisfactory. The United
States delegation is reported to have been the leader in this movement.
This is not surprising, since the U. S. Air Coordinating Committee had
previously indicated its position that the United States regarded the
question of a substantial increase of liability limits as the only one
of major importance.
8 Allison v. Standard Airlines, 1 Avi. 462; 1930 USAvR 292.
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Regardless of the unquestioned importance of the question of
limits, such a position shows a lack of proper appreciation of other
practical considerations involved. I am reliably informed that the
U. S. delegation went so far as to vote against the adoption of obviously
needed changes - like the Escape Clause that was responsible for most
of the litigation, expense and delay to claimants under the existing
9
Convention. The chairman of the U. S. delegation is quoted after the
conference as reiterating the position that, while there were some defects in the Convention, they were not serious, except the one case of
the limit. He was said to state that raising the limits is not a legal but
an economic problem, and I got the distinct impression that he would
be quite happy to change only the limit by protocol, leaving the airlines without relief from the confusion and inequities of the other
provisions that need clarification and correction. I regret that I can
find little evidence in either the attitude of the U. S. delegation or the
ICAO Legal Committee membership as a whole that justice to the
airline is to be considered when it conflicts in any way with the privileged position of a claimant for damages.
Limit on Recovery an Economic, Not a Social Problem
It is true, of course, that the amount of the limit is an economic
problem, as our delegation chairman says, but our delegation refuses
to subject it to economic reasoning. They insist upon political reasoning. I shall discuss this more at length later, but for the moment give
the "economic" reasons for increase as stated in the official ICAO
10
Report of the Rio meeting. It will be noted that these are not economic reasons at all except perhaps in the socialistic sense.
Reason (1) is that judicial awards of damages in non-Warsaw
cases are often much higher than the Warsaw maximum. That is just
as silly as stating that a few men in the United States are 7 feet tall;
therefore, the standard height of men is 7 feet. There have been a
few - a very few - runaway verdicts for passengers in non-Warsaw
cases. Such instances are fractional as compared with the hundreds
of non-Warsaw cases settled in relative comparison to the Warsaw
limit. This sage economic basis does not also say that there have been
a few cases also in which the plaintiff received no award at all. Does
it follow, as an economic conclusion, that the Warsaw limit should be
decreased to zero?
Reason (2) was that the record of air safety had vastly improved
since 1929 and, therefore, the carrier is now involved in lower risks.
Consequently, he should be prepared to pay higher amounts on fewer
accidents. That is most questionable as an economic reason to indicate
a proper limit on recovery.
The improvement in the safety record would (as it has) cause a
reduction in the premium rate, but there is no legitimate connection
9
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whatever between the premium rate paid for insurance and the economic consideration of a proper limit for damages. What interest
could a passenger or his heirs have in the amount of premium paid by
the airline? How could it affect the economic factors involved in an
amount that would be fair as a limit, completely without regard to
what airline caused the injury or what that airline was paying in insurance premiums? This and other reasons advanced by the U. S. delegation, apparently relying upon a report of the Air Coordinating
Committee's Economic Division," discussed later, can only be based
upon the highly socialistic theory of "ability to pay" as a criterion for
liability.
Reason (3) argued that the cost of an increase reflected in the additional insurance premiums payable, in relation to the cost of all air
transport generally, was small. Again, the economic considerations
affecting "ability to pay" are confused or deliberately substituted for
an economic consideration of what would constitute a proper limit of
liability. Again, it must be said that the claimant is not interested in
the slightest in the relative cost of insurance or the cost of air transport
generally. The defense is that the Legal Committee and the delegates
are concerned also with the economics of the airlines and do not wish
to put a greater burden on the airlines than they can bear. I regret
that I have been unable to find any solicitude for the airlines in the
past Sessions of the Legal Committee, or in the Rome 1952 conference,
when Rome and Warsaw revisions were being discussed. I have the
distinct impression that the decision was first made to substantially
increase the limitation for social reasons and then the interest, both
of the U. S. delegation and ACC Economic Division, was to prove that
the higher limits could be paid without economic disaster to the airlines.
The ACC Economic Division Report

Let us look briefly at the contribution of the ACC Economic Division in its effort to justify an increase in the present Warsaw limit. In
the report just referred to, the only relevant statistic produced by that
report fully substantiated the fact that the limit presently provided in
the Warsaw Convention had more than kept economic pace with rising
costs. In its attempt to determine the "real value" of the present Warsaw limit, the ACC Economic Division states:
"The liability limit (125,000 gold francs) in terms of U. S. dollars
increased from $4,898 in 1929 to $8,292 at January, 1953. Thus,
the gold value in currency was increased 169% of the 1929 level
while the cost of living index has gone up to 156% of its earlier
level, resulting in an 8% increase in the buying power of the gold
franc within the United States."

Proponents of increase contend that there is no evidence that the
limit fixed in 1929 was right. The fact is that I know of no proposition that has been so overwhelmingly proven. That the limit was right
in 1929 and is right today in most of the nations now adhering to the
11
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Warsaw Convention is amply proven by the fact that most leading
nations have adopted the Warsaw standard as their non-Warsaw and
domestic standard and in some cases have established lower standards.
My information is that such nations include Belgium, Brazil, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and - to prove
that the limit is still in line with the standards of the times - the great
nation of the United Kingdom adopted the Warsaw standard of liability for its domestic standard in 1952. The ICAO official report of
the Rio conference, itself, admits that "some members of the Legal
Committee stated that their governments considered the existing maximum limits of the Warsaw Convention to be satisfactory." It seems
quite evident that these proponents of increase want more money for
the claimant, not evidence that the Warsaw limit is economically
insufficient. The objective of an international convention, intended
to be appplicable to all parts of the world, must take into account the
different economic and monetary conditions in different nations.
In this connection, a brief look at the "economic conclusions" of
the U. S. Air Coordinating Committee's Economic Division is revealing. It is apparent that the economists making the report are confused
as to the difference between accident and liability protection. In any
event, they appear to forget that the Warsaw Convention and the revision of same deals with liability, not accident insurance. They appear
to ignore the fact that the carrier is not the insurer of his passengers
and should not be, according to American law. His legal obligation
to the passenger is to use the highest degree of care, not to guarantee
safe passage regardless of conditions beyond his control.
Next, not one of their conclusions - except that the real or economic value has increased since 1929 more than the cost of living - has
anything to do with the adequacy of the limit. They go about justifying an increase by the use of the most amazing figures.
They show that insurance cost has gone down and that the cost of
insurance is less than the cost of passenger food. What possible connection does insurance cost or the cost of passenger food have with
respect to the adequacy of the liability limit? It would be just as reasonable to say that ability to pay is the proper criterion for setting a
limit.
(TO BE CONTINUED)

